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                 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
     Mohamed Youla appeals from the judgment of sentence.  After 
indictment in the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware, Youla pleaded 
guilty to social 
security number fraud in violation of 42 U.S.C.  408(a)(7)(B) (Supp. 
2001) and 18 
U.S.C.  2 (2000).  His appeal challenges the District Court's calculation 
of loss and its 
failure to apply  2X1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1998).  
We will 
affirm. 
     The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.  3231.  This 
court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291 and 18 U.S.C.  3742(a). 
                               I. 
     Youla first argues that the District Court erred by calculating the 
loss value as the 
aggregate credit limit on the credit cards he and his coconspirators 
attempted to acquire.  
This court reviews findings of facts under a clearly erroneous standard.  
See, e.g., United 
States v. Hillstrom, 988 F.2d 448, 450 (3d Cir. 1993).  We give plenary 
review to a 
district court's interpretation of the sentencing guidelines, including a 
district court's 
assessment of what constitutes a "loss."  United States v. Sharma, 190 
F.3d 220, 226 (3d 
Cir. 1999). 
     In February of 1998, Youla attempted to purchase credit cards through 
"Moe," an 
FBI informant.  Moe purported to have a relative who worked for a bank and 
could 
acquire the cards, but would only engage in a transaction for a minimum of 
twenty cards.  
Although Youla never actually purchased the credit cards, apparently 
because he 
suspected that Moe was connected with law enforcement, Youla did organize 
the 
requisite number of buyers, agreed to the transaction, and provided Moe 
with sufficient 
names and social security numbers of prospective card purchasers (8 false 
and 12 
authentic) to meet the twenty card order minimum.  Each of the buyers was 
willing to pay 
at least $1,000 per card.  Youla and Mara, one of his confederates, met 
with Moe and his 
"relative," an FBI agent, who showed them twenty credit cards which Moe 
had procured 
using the information provided by Youla and his group.  Youla and Mara 
sampled one of 
the credit cards, and agreed to meet with Moe the following day to 
complete the 
transaction.  Neither Youla nor Mara appeared. 
     The District Court calculated the loss from the social security 
number fraud by 
summing the credit limits of those cards acquired using false social 
security numbers.  
Each of the cards had a credit limit of $50,000.  Multiplying $50,000 by 
eight, the 
number of cards which depended on false social security numbers, the 
District Court set 
the amount of loss at $400,000.  
     Youla argues he should not be held responsible for the false social 
security card 
numbers provided by others.  Under  1B1.3(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual 
conduct relevant to determining the Guideline range includes, "all acts 
and omissions 
committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or 
willfully 
caused by the defendant," including "all reasonably foreseeable acts and 
omissions of 
others in furtherance of a jointly undertaken criminal activity,"  
1B1.3(a)(1)(A)-(B), and 
"all harm that was the object of such acts and omissions,"  1B1.3(a)(3). 
     The District Court found that it was foreseeable to Youla that those 
involved in 
the scheme would use false social security numbers to obtain credit cards.  
Youla himself 
provided a false social security number, and one of his confederates 
described how to 
obtain false identification.  The District Court's finding was not 
erroneous. 
     Youla also argues that the District Court erred in determining that 
he and his 
confederates intended to exhaust the credit limits of the cards.  This 
court's recent 
opinion in United States v. Geevers, 226 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2000), is 
instructive on the 
permissible inferences and burden of proof on determining intended loss.  
In that case, 
we held "that it is not an error of law for a court to draw inferences 
from the face value of 
the checks in arriving at the factual conclusion that the defendant 
intended to [withdraw 
all the funds.]" Id. at 193. 
     We also described the burden of proof for calculating the loss in 
these 
circumstances.  Following a prima face showing by the government that "the 
defendant 
intended to cause the full loss of those amounts," the burden shifts to 
the defendant to 
present "persuasive evidence . . . that his intent was to steal a lesser 
amount."  Id. at 194. 
     The District Court's determination that Youla and his associates 
intended to 
exhaust the credit limits on the cards they acquired was not clearly 
erroneous.  Youla 
claims he intended to repay the credit card debt he incurred, but before 
he was caught 
Youla characterized the purchase of the credit cards as a potentially 
lucrative business.  
Youla described the scheme to a potential participant in terms of the 
credit limit, 
demonstrating his expectation that his cohorts would exhaust their cards.  
The fact that 
the social security numbers were false belies any intent by Youla and his 
confederates to 
repay the debts incurred.  In fact, in Youla's presence, one of his 
confederates explicitly 
expressed an intent to exhaust the credit limits of the cards he would 
acquire. 
     Youla attempts to distinguish Geevers on the grounds that Geevers' 
fraud required 
more effort, Geevers partially succeeded, and Youla withdrew from the 
scheme.  The 
District Court did not err in determining Youla failed to consummate the 
scheme because 
of his concerns about being apprehended by the authorities, not because he 
intended to 
withdraw from the criminal activity.  The remaining differences are 
insufficient to 
distinguish Geevers. 
                              II. 
     Youla's second argument on appeal is that the District Court erred by 
failing to 
reduce Youla's offense level under  2X1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.  
Section 
2X1.1 provides for a reduction of three guideline points for attempts.  
U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual  2X1.1(b)(1) (1998).  Youla argues that because he 
never completed 
his purchase of the credit cards, he should enjoy the benefits of  2X1.1.  
Although a 
motion panel denied Youla's trial counsel's Anders motion because it 
determined that 
Youla's  2X1.1 argument was not frivolous, see United States v. Youla, 
241 F.3d 296, 
301-02 (3d Cir. 2001), Youla's  2X1.1 argument fails on the merits.  In 
Geevers, the 
defendant claimed that because he had only attempted to commit bank fraud, 
the 
sentencing court erred by not reducing his guideline points pursuant to  
2X1.1.  As a 
threshold inquiry to evaluating his claim, we inquired whether the 
defendant pleaded 
guilty to an attempt or to the substantive offense.  We reached the  
2X1.1 issue only 
after concluding it was unclear "from the record whether Geevers should be 
viewed as 
having pleaded guilty solely to a completed crime or an attempt."  
Geevers, 226 F.3d at 
196.  Our confusion rested in part on the bank fraud statute under which 
Geevers was 
convicted.  That statute, 18 U.S.C.  1344, contains both substantive 
offense and attempt 
provisions. 
     Here there is no such confusion.  Youla pleaded guilty to social 
security number 
fraud under 42 U.S.C.  408(a)(7)(B) and 18 U.S.C.  2, neither of which 
contains an 
attempt provision.  Youla did not plead guilty to attempted social 
security number fraud.  
The elements for a violation of 42 U.S.C.  408(a)(7)(B) include (1) 
giving a false social 
security number, (2) represented as a true number, (3) with intent to 
deceive, (4) for the 
purpose of obtaining some benefit to which the defendant is not entitled.  
Youla pleaded 
guilty to this offense, effectively conceding he completed all elements, 
and the evidence 
supports his plea.  A reduction under  2X1.1 is not available. 
                              III. 
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                           /s/ Delores K. Sloviter 
                          Circuit Judge
 
